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Abstract
Research focused on measuring attitudes towards violent extremist
groups and the appeal of violent extremist ideologies among the
vulnerable communities in the United States remains under-researched.
This focus group research attempts to close such a research gap. In May
of 2018, International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE)
researchers focus tested ICSVE-produced counter-narratives with
Somali-American youth in San Diego, CA, namely with Somali-American
youth convened at the East African Cultural Community Center and the
premises of San Diego State University. In addition to raising awareness
about the dangers of joining violent extremist groups like Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and lending promising evidence that speaks to
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the quality and authenticity of our counter-narratives, this article
presents a methodological argument, or a case study, in the use of
counter narratives as an effective Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) tool.
The use of counter narratives also served to start important
conversations and engage with the Somali American community in a way
that could open a path towards testing our counter-narrative content
among those whom we might be able to detect a more substantial
persuasive effect.
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Introduction  
 
As many as 40,000 foreign fighters from more than 110 countries joined 
ISIS and other jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria.1 In the United States 
alone, over 200 individuals were either recruited or groomed into joining 
ISIS in Syria and Iraq.2 The George Washington University’s (GWU) 
Program on Extremism researchers listed Ohio, Virginia, and Minnesota 
as the states with highest volunteer rate into conflict zones in Iraq and 
Syria.3 These are states with a high representation, vis a vis other states, of 
Somali immigrants. ISIS and other violent extremist groups have been 
particularly successful in targeting Somali-American communities, which 
are primarily concentrated in Columbus, Ohio; San Diego, California; and 
St Paul, Minnesota, with a considerable presence in the Commonwealth of 
Virginia as well.4 
 
As of 2016, at least 20 young Minnesotans, primarily ethnic Somalis, have 
left to join violent extremist groups in Iraq and Syria, with at least five 
believed to have been killed there.5 At least nine Minnesotans have been 
arrested since 2014 for attempting to join terrorist groups in Iraq and 
Syria.6 Other examples include twenty-nine-year-old Abdifatah Dayib 
Ahmed, also known as Abdirahman Muhumed, who left Minnesota in 
2014 to join ISIS in Syria. He was reportedly killed in Syria.7 Likewise, 
Somali American Mohamed Osman Mahmoud was sentenced to 30 years 
in prison in 2014 for his alleged role in planning to detonate a bomb at a 
tree-lighting ceremony in Portland, Oregon.8 
 
As the evidence suggests, Somali Americans in particular remain 
vulnerable for recruitment into ISIS and other violent extremist groups. 
Communities at risk, such as Somali, and those serving them, need the 
necessary training and tools to counter the narratives and calls to action of 
violent extremist groups like ISIS. Such groups are currently active on 
social media, and even pinpoint these communities.9 
 
While ISIS is likely to lose its remaining strongholds in Syria, as it has in 
much of Iraq, its powerful ideology, operations, and tactics are likely to 
remain active. In fact, there is strong evidence to suggest that the terrorist 
group has not disappeared despite its territorial loses and heavy 
decapitation of the leadership.10 The group has morphed into an 
underground insurgency and movement heavily networked through the 
now global dispersion of its fighter supporters.11 It remains capable of 
maintaining and further strengthening its remaining networks; deploying 
battle-hardened terrorists to wage terrorist acts in the country of origin or 
elsewhere; and to lure in, inspire, and encourage those who never 
managed to travel to Syria or Iraq to attack at home.  
 
In addition to defeating them militarily on the ground, central to our CVE 
efforts remains the task of preventing attacks at home by raising 
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awareness about the dangers emanating from violent extremist groups and 
building resilience to recruitment in our communities. Civil society 
organizations have a major role to play in this respect, especially when 
knowing that many vulnerable Muslim communities in the United States 
remain skeptical of government involvement in CVE-related matters—and 
at times of CVE initiatives at all—often suspecting anyone involved in CVE 
matters as working as government informants.12  
 
This article reports on the ICSVE’s efforts to offer access to such resources 
to Somali community members in San Diego, CA. ICSVE organized 
community sponsored activist meetings held in small groups with Somali 
American youth at the East African Cultural Community Center and the 
premises of San Diego State University.13The goal was to engage them in 
discussions about the ICSVE Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative 
videos, which feature ISIS defectors, returnees, and prisoners speaking out 
against the group. The authors used two methods to conduct their study: 
Focus groups for data collection and content analysis for data analysis.  
 
Somali-American Radicalization and Violent Extremism 
Context 
 
While all communities remain susceptible and vulnerable to the appeal of 
terrorist organizations like ISIS and al Shabaab, the appeal and 
susceptibility of the Somali-American community to such groups remains 
especially puzzling for many CVE and government professionals. Several 
factors, namely a complex set of grievances, whether real or perceived, 
rooted in negative perceptions towards Muslims in general and black 
males in particular are key contributors. Other factors include a profound 
identity crisis among the American-Somali youth rooted in being new 
immigrants and often entering an unsupportive, if not hostile, 
environment along with challenged family structures with the loss of 
father figures for many new immigrants who fled from war-torn Somalia. 
Socially, a milieu remains highly concerned over ongoing civil conflict in 
Somalia, and social and educational systems often fail to provide adequate 
safety nets. Local imams also fail at times to understand, reach, and 
educate Somali American youth about positive and peaceful 
interpretations of Islam that might explain the struggle of the Somali-
American community to effectively counter the appeal of violent 
extremists and terrorist groups. All of these factors have presented an 
opportunity for extremist groups to manipulate these communities and 
encourage vulnerable youth living in America to join terrorist groups such 
as al-Shabaab and ISIS.14  
 
Research has highlighted identity-related challenges within the Somali-
American community, as many of them belong to the pool of first-
generation immigrants and have in many cases failed to integrate into 
mainstream society. Vulnerabilities also become apparent as many 
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Somalis occupy shares of single-family households that have been 
traumatically bereaved and lacking a father figure.15 In combination, all 
these factors appear to increase the lure of groups like ISIS and al 
Shabaab, who seem to offer them a fictive kinship, masculine role models, 
and escape from boredom and frustration. They also offer adventures, 
alongside new positive identities and feelings of personal significance to 
address global conflicts and seek meaning and purpose in life. 
 
The combined issues of individual and collective history of psychological 
traumatization, community tensions upon landing in the United States, 
customary immigrant-related challenges, and family bereavements and 
broken families all play a part. These could also be categorized as issues of 
identity, challenged family structures, educational and social mobility 
challenges, grievances over discrimination (perceived and real), and so 
forth. All these conditions make them vulnerable to violent extremist 
groups like ISIS. 
 
Some authors find poverty and lack of social mobility as questionable 
motivations for departing to the conflict zones in Iraq and Syria.16 Indeed, 
poverty and lack of social mobility alone are unlikely to be sufficient 
causes for joining, but these factors become important when combined 
with exposure to a terrorist group and its ideology. Terrorist groups tend 
to take advantage of these factors, but without exposure to the group, we 
are highly unlikely to a see a terrorist emerge or form. Others also stress 
the lack of adequate “language and cultural training prior to migration 
[primarily following the ousting of general Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991] 
as a reason leading to the greater insularity of Somali community 
compared to other, more integrated Muslim immigrant communities,” 
which may also be another factor challenging these particular 
immigrants.17 
 
At the ICSVE, we generally view the making of a terrorist as a function of 
multiple levels of actors and forces. To make a terrorist, there must be a 
group purporting to represent some segment of a society and presenting 
violence as an answer to contentious socio-political issues facing that 
particular segment of the society. The group also provides an ideology to 
justify terrorist violence and garner social support for both the group and 
its ideology. Three variables—the group, ideology, and social support—
then interact with the vulnerabilities and motivations existing at the level 
of the individual.18 
 
In the case of Somali-American recruitment, the legacy of the conflict in 
Somalia and the active presence of terrorist groups there have created 
enduring opportunities and links for Somali-American immigrants to join 
“jihad” back in Somalia. This was first evidenced through a first wave of 
young Somalis departing Minneapolis and other areas to support al-
Shabaab and other groups in Somalia between 2006 and 2011. This wave 
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speaks to the success of groups like al-Shabaab, and later ISIS, at 
recruiting among the members of Somali-American community.19 In 
Minnesota, a European al Shabaab fighter became the first to recruit 
among vulnerable Somali youth. He stressed the urgency to join the 
conflict in defense of what he claimed would be the massive rape of their 
Somali “sisters” by foreign Kenyan soldiers.20 This narrative naturally 
appealed to the challenged manhood of young immigrant Somali men who 
were finding they were failing to integrate into Somali American 
community or who at times even felt rejected by the African-American 
community.21 
 
The first wave of Somali Americans became their own force of recruitment, 
namely using Twitter, Facebook and other social media platforms to 
induce, incite, and shame their fellow Somali Americans into joining. This 
led to the creation of the second wave of Minnesotan Somali American 
recruits. Although in many cases socially better integrated—even included 
an aspiring medical student among them—they responded to the appeal of 
their “brothers” who used social media to glorify the Somali “jihad” while 
often shaming their counterparts for “hanging out at the Mall of 
America.”22 
 
Later waves of Somali-American immigrants joining and attempting to 
join terrorist groups abroad followed the onset of the Syrian conflicts and 
the partial merging of ISIS and al Shabaab.23 During this time, Somalis 
were recruited not only into al Shabaab but also into ISIS in Iraq and 
Syria. While on-the-ground recruitment and grooming for recruitment 
during all three waves of recruitment of Somali Americans appears to have 
been minimal, with nearly all coming via the Internet, some suggest that 
recruiters sending young Somalis to the conflict zones in Iraq and Syria 
were the same recruiters who sent many young Somalis to join Al Shabaab 
and other groups in Somalia.24 
 
Whereas on-the-ground ISIS recruiters and networks facilitating travel to 
Syria and Iraq were quite active in Europe and the Balkans, in the United, 
for instance, the most recruiting has occurred via the Internet. Sometimes, 
the process involved one or more individuals serving as a recruitment 
node using downloads and online connections to facilitate further face-to-
face recruiting with others on- the- ground inside the United States. 
Although social media and online recruitment is known to play an 
important role in moving individuals inside the United States along the 
violent extremism and terrorism trajectory, with respect to the members 
of Somali community in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, some suggest that 
face-to-face interactions represented the key component of recruitment 
into terrorist organizations like ISIS. In other words, social media and 
online recruitment in the context of Somali community recruitment in the 
Minneapolis-St. Paul area primarily served to spread extremist messages 
already propagated by extremist recruiters on the ground.25 While 
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evidence exists to suggest that some youth who downloaded extremist 
propaganda served as recruitment hubs for inciting others, evidence of 
actual recruiters traveling in from outside the United States to target these 
communities when it came to ISIS remains largely absent. 
 
Whereas al-Shabaab recruiters appealed to an “Islamic-nationalist 
identity” to lure its potential recruits—also as a means to overcome clan 
divisions within the country—though recently it has also resorted to the 
call for “Islamist nationalism” to mobilize, ISIS recruitment widened to 
those of other victims of war-torn areas and to the idea of global jihad and 
the so-called Caliphate it created. 26 Some argued that while ISIS’ appeal 
served to antagonize local jihadi groups (for example, in Somalia) and 
other powerful non-Muslim states in the region, the group deemed such a 
strategy as necessary to both attract recruits in the so-called Caliphate and 
reclaim the status of the “champion of the global jihadist ideal.”27 In 
addressing this change in recruitment appeals between al Shabaab and 
ISIS, as well as the phenomenon of young Twin City Somali travelers the 
conflict zone in Syria, some researchers note:  
 
Al Shabaab’s recruiting message had been based on nationalism 
and genealogy, as well as religion, and multiple sources said they 
could understand the enduring desire to see their mother country 
stabilize and improve, even as they disagreed with the extremist 
interpretation of Islam that al Shabaab espouses. In Syria, however, 
that nationalistic zeal does not apply, meaning recruiters are 
attracting young people not based on their country of origin but by 
appealing to the notion of a global Muslim community and ISIL’s 
vision of a caliphate and apocalypse.28 
 
Policy recommendations stemming from studies focused on the Somali-
American community included helping immigrants to integrate by 
extending more resources to the community and helping them to 
overcome obstacles to integrating successfully. The recommendations 
highlighted that the “self-imposed” segregation and a desire to adhere to 
cultural heritage in the Somali American community may also serve as a 
leeway for radical extremist elements to radicalize young Somalis even 
more, and that some changes may need to occur from inside the 
community as well. They also included winning “the hearts and minds” of 
the community so as not to alienate crucial partners in the fight against 
violent extremism.29 Indeed, in some Somali American communities, the 
words CVE and counter-terrorism seem to have taken on a negative 
connotation and are being associated with informants and negative 
profiling.30  
 
Other studies on the Somali-American community identified both 
challenges related to extremism and measures aimed at reducing 
susceptibility to radicalization and recruitment. One such measure 
Speckhard et al.: Intervening in and Preventing Somali-American Radicalization with
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019
37 
 
included a focus on “multi-level community” interventions. The value of 
approaching the issue of extremism from this perspective is that it extends 
beyond family-level interventions and takes a systemic view of the 
problems. Such projects have also been defined as long-term, social, 
economic, and educational in nature. For instance, multi-level 
intervention programs are called for to engage local imams and other 
important community leaders in the ideological debate and provide them 
with necessary tools and training to prevent the recruitment of Somali 
youth. These reputable imams and religious workers, or other Somali male 
mentors, would also be enlisted to work with youth and encourage their 
development in the areas of education, careers, and personal development. 
Others recommended generating programs that encourage civil 
engagement and public service among the young. An equally important 
aspect of the multi-level intervention approach is to counter extremist 
narratives and propaganda online by introducing alternative viewpoints 
targeted through public messaging and information campaigns.31  
 
Community-level collaborative partnerships are highlighted in the 
literature as being important in developing, testing, and monitoring 
intervention prevention strategies through partnerships with local 
associates, businesses, and mosques—to just name a few. The emphasis is 
placed on interdisciplinary collaborations involving law enforcement, 
education, social and mental health services, and academia. The primary 
goal of such interventions is to identify relevant psychosocial and societal 
processes from within the Somali-American community that could 
potentially strengthen counter radicalization and counterterrorism efforts. 
The specific program initiatives include leveraging psychosocial processes, 
namely understand the inter-relatedness between different social factors 
and an individual’s thought, behavior, learning process, and other 
psychological factors, to support the activities of law enforcement in the 
realm of counterterrorism; generate collaborative radicalization 
prevention programs involving government, civil society, and other CVE 
practitioners and actors; generate research to better understand 
counterterrorism and/or psychosocial issues in these communities; and 
provide necessary culturally-based and culturally-informed education, 
training, and technical assistance to law enforcement and psychosocial 
workers fighting terrorism.32In an effort to increase diversity within the 
force, some law enforcement units in the country have also begun to hire 
qualified candidates from within the Somali American community and 
allocate resources to community engagement efforts.33 
 
One such approach also involves strengthening community and family 
protective services. This can be done by encouraging and strengthening 
parental involvement in the areas such as education and mentoring. This 
is especially important given the history of violent conflicts many Somali 
families had to endure back in Somalia and the likelihood that many might 
carry scars of psychological trauma. This particular approach also involves 
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government outreach activities and involvement of faith-based 
communities and organizations. Other efforts are focused on building 
family interventions through research and understanding of social 
circumstances from the perspective of refugees and the immigrant 
segment of Somali-American youth, including from single mother 
households. For instance, research into single mother Somali-American 
households may help to understand the challenges of mother-led families 
who are trying to cope with their youth. This could also help to understand 
how being from mother-led family households affects identify formation 
and how it may leave some vulnerable to looking for positive masculine 
relationships and models.34 
 
Literature Review on Narratives and Counter-Narratives 
 
Corman defined narratives as a “system of stories that share themes, 
forms, and architypes.”35 Whereas stories represent a “sequence of events 
involving actors and actions,” narratives do not require full stories, as they 
can simply be communicated through use of words, graphics, or 
phrases.36The most effective narratives are the ones characterized by 
legitimacy, compelling purpose, consistency, quantifiable results, and 
relevancy in the eyes of potential supporters and sympathizers.37 
 
In designing narratives, extremist groups make use of historical events, 
religious terminology, political events, and appeal to higher authorities, 
among others, to generate an intended audience.38 Their narratives are 
strategically designed and customized to the needs and vulnerabilities of 
their target audience. They are also launched to motivate to engage and 
execute certain actions, including violent actions.39 There is significant 
consensus regarding the impact of narratives on “beliefs, attitudes, 
intentions, and behaviors,” both for the purposes of radicalization and to 
fight radicalization.40 Strictly speaking, in the context of violent extremism 
and terrorism, researchers have identified four criteria that are important 
in constructing counter-narratives:  
 
1) “Revealing incongruities and contradictions in the terrorist 
narratives and how terrorists act,  
2) Disrupting analogies between the target narrative and real-world 
events,  
3) Disrupting binary themes of the group’s ideology, and  
4) Advocating an alternative view of the terrorist narrative’s target.”41  
 
Counter-narratives are especially powerful when 1) rooted in sound 
research and understanding of the extremist narrative, 2) rooted in the 
sound understanding of elements of radicalization and behavioral change, 
3) aimed at specific [target] audience, 4) perceived by receiving audience 
as credible, and 5) format and message distribution is highly controlled.42  
 
Speckhard et al.: Intervening in and Preventing Somali-American Radicalization with
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019
39 
 
There are three types of messaging, narrative frameworks, or narrative 
approaches that can be effectively used to counter violent extremism: 
Alternative narratives, counter-narratives, and government strategic 
communications. 43 Counter-narratives serve to target and discredit 
terrorist groups and their ideologies by deconstructing and demystifying 
their messages to demonstrate their lies, hypocrisy, and inconsistencies. 
Briggs and Feve described counter-narratives as a strategy that “challenges 
extremist and violent extremist messages, whether directly or indirectly, 
through a range of online and offline means.”44 Provided they are logically 
structured and conceivable in the eyes of the target audience, they can be 
powerful in challenging and amplifying contradictions in extremist 
narrative.45 While counter-narratives are reactive in nature, meaning they 
are created in response to certain extremist narratives, alternative 
narratives complement counter-narratives  by emphasizing democratic 
values, positive social change, and “undercutting violent extremist 
narratives by focusing on what we are ‘for’ rather than ‘against.’” 46   
 
Lastly, government strategic communications refer to government efforts 
aimed at clarifying government policies, stance, or actions towards an 
issue. It also includes public awareness activities. Both government 
strategic communications and alternative narratives can be useful for 
prevention but are unlikely to reach those already being seduced by 
terrorist ideologies and groups and thereby narrowing their focus to 
messaging only from terrorists. In addition, both counter-narratives and 
alternative narratives can reinforce each-other’s effectiveness if used 
simultaneously.47 
 
Both counter-narratives and alternative narratives are rooted in 
theoretical assumptions that they can be used to prevent and counter 
radicalization and violent extremism. Some authors question the utility of 
counter-narratives as a constructive method of preventing and countering 
violent extremism, as they are primarily focused on targeting ideology and 
that they fail to differentiate between violent behaviors and radical beliefs 
and ideology.48 More specifically, some authors argued that there is a 
fallacy in assuming that ideas are root causes of violent behavior and that 
“violent acts can be prevented by removing or falsifying ideas.”49 Glazzard 
summarized such assumptions as “violent ideas lead to violent deeds, that 
counter-narratives can replace terrorist narratives, and that the actual 
threat of violent extremism can be mitigated through discourse.”50  
 
Others contended that counter-narratives can be especially problematic in 
that they can  strengthen extremists’ conviction and further reinforce the 
narrative [for example, ideological] they are attempting to counter: “ 
When counter-narrative talks up the ideology and demonizes it, the 
ideology is also glamorized and made more attractive, and it is 
empowered.51 Indeed, one should not discount potential impact when 
ideologically attenuated individuals view counter-narratives (cognitive 
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dissonance) as well as the potential impact on those who are unsure of 
what to believe and are searching for ISIS propaganda material.  
 
While these risks exist, one could also argue that not all counter-narratives 
target ideology alone. They also highlight real-life stories of insiders to 
highlight the human costs of engaging in violent extremism and terrorism 
for both for the recruit and those harmed by the group. Moreover, the 
primary objective of counter-narratives is to discredit violent extremist 
groups in the eyes of potential recruits to and save them from the costs 
associated with engaging in violent extremism.52 
 
A number of counter-narrative campaigns have been constructed and 
launched over the years. Quilliam, a UK-based CVE organization, in 
partnership with Verbalisation, launched#NotAnotherBrother to fight the 
appeal of violent extremism. As part of the campaign, a short counter-
narrative video was released on YouTube to counter the social media 
recruitment of terrorist groups like ISIS.53 Following the November 2015 
Paris attacks, Quilliam launched # NousSommesUnis video to raise 
awareness about the dangers of violent extremism and emphasize unity 
between the West and Muslims.54 
 
Jigsaw, a Google in-house think tank, piloted the “Redirect Method” to 
target individuals most susceptible to ISIS recruitment and redirect them 
to YouTube and other counter-narratives and alternative narratives that 
subtly undermine ISIS. While the initiative targeted ISIS recruiting 
themes, it did not specifically target ISIS.55To prevent UK’s young Muslims 
from leaving to conflict zones in Iraq and Syria, a group of former 
extremists created a popular online cartoon called “Abdullah X.” The 
character of Abdullah represents a young disillusioned Muslim who is 
initially attracted to the kind of ideology terrorist and extremist groups 
like ISIS espouse but who, in the end, decides not to follow the extremist 
path.56 
 
In December of 2017, ICSVE researchers launched a Facebook ad 
campaign using one of their counter-narratives. The ad targeted Iraq, 
where Facebook is currently the most widely used social media platform. 
The campaign led close to 1.7 million views and hundreds of specific 
comments related to both the counter-narrative and ISIS in general.57 
International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism researchers also 
launched Facebook campaigns that targeted in English and Albanian 
language Facebook users who evidenced support for ISIS and found that 
they could reach this audience and engage them with the counter narrative 
videos.58 International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism staff also 
routinely places their counter-narrative videos on YouTube and monitors 
the many comments. Particularly those comments in Arabic language 
suggest that they are reaching a target audience that engages with the 
videos, oftentimes in a highly heated manner. 
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Although well intentioned, some counter-narrative and alternative 
narrative campaigns launched over the years have been heavily criticized 
by CVE and counter-terrorism professionals. For example, the U.S. State 
Department’s “Think Again, Turn Away” campaign against ISIS was 
criticized because it heavily relied on recycling ISIS’ violent footage in 
ways that some believed may have served to “legitimize terrorists.”59 
Similarly, during the last fifteen years, the UK Home office commissioned 
websites and groups to argue against the use of “martyrdom” and terrorist 
group’s call to militant jihad. Largely relying on cognitive arguments and 
using Islamic scriptures, these attempts were directed at presenting 
moderate views of Islam. However, they fell flat when it came to 
addressing the grievances that terrorists were so adept at using. More 
importantly, they fell flat in the face of al-Qaeda’s, and now ISIS’, use of 
emotionally evocative pictures, videos, and graphic images arguing that 
Islam, Muslims, and Muslim lands are under attack by the West, including 
that jihad is an obligatory duty of all Muslims and that “martyrdom” 
missions are called for in Islam.60 
 
ISIS’ creative and emotionally evocative use of video alongside of their 
advantage of social media feedback mechanisms made counter-narratives 
that are based on cognitive argument alone, versus emotionally evocative 
counter stories, pale in comparison to what ISIS puts out. In this regard, 
voices of disillusioned ISIS cadres, when coupled with emotionally 
evocative imagery, may serve more effectively as tools to discredit ISIS and 
their militant jihadi ideology.61  
 
Intervening in and Preventing Somali-American Radicalization 
with Counter Narratives 
 
Focus group settings are rarely seen in the terrorism/CVE literature as a 
source of data. This is unfortunate, as the intimate settings afforded by 
focus groups allow for the collection of outstanding qualitative data that 
can serve as the foundation for theorizing and exploring further about 
issues in question, such as in this case of resonance of vulnerable 
populations to ISIS and its recruitment tactics, as well as ways to bolster 
resilience to the same.62 
 
In light of the literature findings and previous success, focus testing of the 
ICSVE Breaking the ISIS Brand counter narrative videos in multiple 
venues worldwide, ICSVE staff proposed to introduce focus groups 
discussions to Somali American youth led by a local Somali role model 
utilizing ISIS-related counter narrative videos. The purpose of the focus 
group testing was to: 
 
1. Start conversations and engage with the Somali American 
community about violent extremism in a manner that might engage 
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an audience already considered vulnerable and alienated vis-à-vis 
CVE efforts.    
2. Open a path towards testing our counter-narrative content by 
engaging in conversations centered on the counter narratives to 
learn if and how they might have a substantial dissuading affect, as 
intended.  
3. Discuss relevant topics they are likely to encounter from groups like 
ISIS as it pertains to ISIS extremist material and propaganda 
online.  
4. Utilize the ICSVE Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter Narrative 
Videos to argue against the claims and promises that ISIS makes to 
youth. While the flow of “foreign fighters” to Iraq and Syria has 
decreased significantly in light of the group’s recent territorial 
losses in Iraq and much of Syria, violent extremist groups like ISIS 
continue to recruit and entice vulnerable youth into violence—
perhaps even accelerating their work in this regard of late. 
Reducing the ability of online propaganda and recruiters to entice 
and dupe youth is a key to further reducing ISIS or similar violent 
extremist group’s power. 
5. Offer educational training and tools to vulnerable communities to 
fight seductive messages that ISIS and similar violent extremist 
groups continue to propagate.  
 
Ethics of Counter-Narrative Production 
 
As researchers, we strive to develop a sound understanding of the problem 
we are trying to address. In other words, we aim to identify the type of 
message or communication campaign that is most likely to resonate with 
our target audience. In this regard, field research becomes a starting point 
to get to the desired objectives. Through our primary, field research into 
violent extremist groups like ISIS, we have developed an in-depth 
understanding of the narratives that we aim to counter  and the many 
ways in which joiners to ISIS first learned of the group and were enticed 
into it—often via the Internet. In creating our counter-narratives, we 
carefully consider the elements of a narrative that could be most appealing 
to our target audience. We also consider why members of our target 
audience could be attracted to such narratives.63 
 
International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism researchers have 
to date interviewed ninety-four ISIS and sixteen al-Shabaab related violent 
extremists, including their family members. Their stories take central 
stage in our counter-narratives. Before interviews, we make sure that we 
gain informed consent from our participants. International Center for the 
Study of Violent Extremism researcher give a special care and attention to 
those in prison to make sure they are speaking freely and know that they 
may be under surveillance that neither they nor we can control. We avoid 
posing any questions that could lead to the disclosure and admission of 
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potential crimes or participation in illegal activities. Before the counter-
narratives are produced and distributed, the participants decide whether 
they want their faces blurred and names withheld (use pseudonyms). 
 
Methodology 
 
In May of 2018, ICSVE researchers conducted two focus groups in San 
Diego, CA. The authors relied on focus groups for data collection and 
content analysis for data analysis. Focus groups took place at the East 
African Cultural Community Center and the premises of San Diego 
University. The focus groups were conducted as part of ICSVE’s efforts to 
measure and evaluate the effectiveness of its counter-narrative videos, 
namely “A Sex Slave for You—A gift from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi” and 
“Rewards for Joining the Islamic State,” in generating useful discussions 
about topics relevant to ISIS recruiting among the members of the Somali 
American community. The focus group discussion and testing were 
designed to gather information from the participants about the 
counternarrative videos and about the following outcomes: 
 
1. To understand participants views about the so-called Islamic State 
2. Assess qualitative and content-based aspects of our counter-
narratives (for example, authenticity of the character/actor featured 
in the counter-narrative) 
3. To open discussions about topics that ISIS is raising in its Internet 
recruiting, with an alternative focus that denounces the terrorist 
group and its false claims 
4. To raise awareness about the dangers of joining terrorist 
organizations like ISIS. 
5. To understand the role of counter-narratives in helping to create 
resilience against violent extremist groups and ideologies in their 
respective communities. 
6. To offer participants necessary educational tools to thwart the 
appeal of violent extremist and terrorist groups in their respective 
communities.  
 
Compared to our other attempts aimed at directly reaching the same 
audience that ISIS targets, this particular focus group was conducted with 
a convenience sample of Somali-Americans in San Diego, California.64 
 
In part, the authors chose San Diego for its large Somali American 
community and its history associated with violent extremism and 
terrorism. For instance, one of the 9/11 terrorist cells were based in San 
Diego. The internationally known terrorist ideologue, Anwar al-Awlaki, 
who was killed in a drone strike in 2011, was a San Diego cleric who 
actively engaged America youth, although it is not clear what his effect was 
during those years.65 In 2014, Douglas McArthur McCain, a former City 
College student, left San Diego to become an ISIS fighter, eventually 
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ending up killed in Syria. His brother was indicted for making false claims 
to law enforcement.66 The office of the Southern District of California U.S. 
Attorney’s office prosecuted four Somali immigrants for providing 
material support to Al Shabaab.67 
 
We also considered the availability of a suitable and credible (within the 
Somali-American community) Somali American role model to run the 
discussions. Lastly, many young Somalis in the San Diego area remain 
vulnerable to the social media recruiting tactics used by terrorist groups 
like ISIS.  
 
The ICSVE researchers facilitated two separate focus groups. Participants 
in Focus Group 1 were shown “Rewards for Joining the Islamic State,” 
whereas Focus Group 2 participants “A Sex Slave for You—A Gift from Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi.” Each group contained 5-7 participants.68 Participants 
were selected randomly and by relying on a snowball sampling technique 
(for example, by relying on friend/colleague referrals; at the gym, coffee 
shops, etc.). The average age of the participants in both focus groups was 
26. All participants were Sunni and male. See Table 1 below for the 
demographic breakdown.  
 
Table 1. Demographic Data of Focus Group Participants 
                                                                            Age                             Education                           
Economic Status  
 
 
FG1- Participant 1                                               21                            Some University                     
Lower/poor 
FG1- Participant 2                                               23                            Some University                     
Lower/poor 
FG1-Participant  3                                               30                                 Bachelor’s                          
Lower/poor 
FG1-Participant 4                                                28                               MA or Ph.D.                           
Middle 
FG1-Participant 5                                                30                           Some University                         
Middle 
 
FG2-Participant 1                                               27                                University                           
Lower/poor 
FG2-Particpant  2                                               25                                12th Grade                           
Lower/poor 
FG2-Participant 3                                               25                                12th Grade                           
Lower/poor 
FG2-Participant 4                                               26                                University                           
Lower/poor 
FG2-Participant 5                                               27                                University                           
Lower/poor 
Notes: Focus Group (FG); Source: Author  
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We provided the participants with a description and overall objective of 
the study. It clearly spelled out, risks, if any, involved in participation. 
They were allowed to skip any question they did not feel confident or 
comfortable discussing. We also informed them that they could leave the 
room any time they wished to do so. We also provided them with a consent 
form to sign, although verbal consents were approved in the case of those 
who were hesitant about signing the form and thereby identifying 
themselves. We informed them how their responses would be used. A copy 
of the signed consent form was kept with a facilitator and a second copy 
was handed to the participants. Once the video was shown to the 
participants, a semi-structured paper and pencil survey also containing 
some open-ended questions was filled out to capture participants’ 
anonymous responses and to ensure that everyone’s responses would be 
recorded versus only the vocal participants. Next, participants were 
engaged in an open, class-like discussion forum to further engage on the 
topics presented. We did not use a pre-testing method, as prior attitudes 
do not necessarily predict future behavior and there was concern that 
asking about prior views about the group might be seen as collecting data 
for law enforcement and intelligence gathering purposes.69 Future focus 
group testing may include pre-testing to account for participant prior 
knowledge or any possible bias associated with participant behavior, 
although this is an extremely sensitive issue in these communities.  
 
Validity, Appropriateness and Constraints of Focus Groups as 
Data Collection Methods 
 
As a qualitative research method, focus groups have and continue to be 
used in social sciences, including in the realm of radicalization, violent 
extremism, and terrorism.70 Table 2 below reflects advantages and 
disadvantages of using focus groups as data collection methods. Such 
observations are rooted in both literature review and author observation 
during this particular research.71  
 
Table 2. Advantages vs. Disadvantages of Using Focus Groups as 
Data Collection Method 
Advantages                                                                                            Disadvantages 
• Time and resource effective in 
collection information, as 
engaging more than one 
participant at a time 
• All participants given the 
opportunity to participate in 
discussions 
• Participants given the opportunity 
to build on each-other’s ideas 
• Group interaction leading to 
better understanding on how 
people explain and understand 
• Potential Moderator induced bias 
• Participants apprehensive about 
expressing their opinions publicly 
• Potentially exclude important 
voices of those who are not 
comfortable or do not accept to 
speak publicly 
• Some participants may dominate 
over other. Remedy: Participants 
given equal share of participation. 
Remain tactful with outspoken 
members of the group and ensure 
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certain issues, including how they 
differ in such issues. 
• Invaluable in measuring as to 
what changes participants 
support or like to see occur (for 
example, by viewing our counter 
narratives). 
• Participants may be willing and 
motivated to take action (for 
example, discuss and share 
counter narratives) because of 
group interaction. 
• Participants supporting each-
other can help to think more 
creatively  
• Leading to rich data 
that the voices of all participants 
are heard. 
• Difficulties in distinguishing 
between individual view and 
group view 
• Difficulties in organizing and 
ordering data for analysis 
 
Source: Author  
 
Data Analysis 
 
The results section of the article contains survey results administered in 
our two focus groups. To analyze the responses of our participants during 
the focus group discussions, we relied on content analysis. Janis defined 
content analysis as any technique: 
 
(a) For the classification of the sign-vehicles 
(b) Which relies solely upon the judgments (which theoretically may 
range from perceptual discrimination to sheer guesses) of an 
analyst or group of analysts as to which sign-vehicles fall into 
which categories 
(c) Provided that the analyst’s judgments are regarded as the report 
of a scientific observer.72 
 
There are several distinct types of content analysis, namely: 
 
• “Sign-in vehicle analysis: Analyzing psychophysical properties of 
the data. For example, to assess the extent to which a topic may be 
emotionally appealing to our participants, we would have to 
examine the number of emotion-laden words used by our 
participants. Counting the number and types of words used is 
essential under this type.” 
• “Pragmatic content analysis: The focus of the analysis is to 
understand why something is said.” 
• “Semantical content analysis, which can be divided into three 
categories: 
o Designation analysis: Implies simple frequency counting 
analysis. In other words, it denotes frequency with which 
concepts, actors, institutions, etc. are mentioned. 
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o Attribution analysis: It also denotes a simple frequency 
counting exercise; however, the focus is on counting 
adjectives, descriptive phrases, etc.  
o Assertion analysis: A combination of designation and 
attribution analysis. It denotes frequency with which certain 
actors, concepts, institutions, etc., are characterized in a 
particular way.”73 
 
We started our analysis by using open coding, or the process of examining 
our transcripts and notes to create important categories of information 
based on the participants’ responses. We first engaged in the process of 
“saturation” to “look for instances that represent a category” [or themes] 
with relevant sub-categories or sub-theme. ”74 Such process led to the 
creation of preliminary or initial coding frameworks, based on participant 
response readings and analysis of our notes. Before the coding, we 
assessed the reliability of our coding system by relying on inter-rater 
reliability. It serves to measure the level of agreement between the coders 
(researchers) and provides a quantitative index of the reliability of the 
code recording system we have created (Cohen’s Kappa coefficient of 
.70).75 Given the nature of our focus groups, we opted to compute a 
general rater reliability score, as our focus was on generating general 
themes within our discussion groups as opposed to focus on specific units. 
 
Once the initial open coding process was finalized—to the extent possible—
we then moved to collecting and organizing major themes (including 
phrases, which later proved to be helpful when it came to utilizing the 
NVivo software) into a single page. This was instrumental in locating and 
crossing out all the duplications and drastically reducing the number of 
relevant categories or themes. This particular list “governed” our analysis 
and helped to divide the interviews into more manageable categories. In 
the third stage, we went back to analyzing both “meaning units” and 
“textural descriptions” to generate my sub-categories or sub-themes.76 In 
other words, a number of sub-themes or sub-categories became evident 
and we organized them along Janesick’s formatting lines:77 
 
Example: The question related to the feelings about ISIS included 
the major themes:  
 
ISIS is evil: This major category or theme was represented in three 
subcategories:  
(a) Un-Islamic and not based in the Quran  
(b) Killing innocent civilians, and  
(c) Killing other Muslims  
 
NVivo qualitative software was instrumental in finding themes and 
analyzing the transcripts of the focus group answers. The software was 
especially useful in employing the “auto-coding” feature, which was used 
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to place all answers to a certain question under one particular node. For 
instance, if we wanted to find out about our participants’ views on 
particular aspect of the counter-narrative, we would click node,” Q1: 
Reasons for liking or disliking the video.” Put differently, we grouped 
participants’ views under the aforementioned category (all answers to a 
single question grouped under one single category or page). This approach 
represented the  quickest and most efficient way to look for patterns and 
more closely examine any pertinent themes,  given they were all grouped 
under the same category. 
 
We used other important features of NVivo’s “auto-coding,” such as “word 
frequency,” to look for most commonly utilized words by our participants 
(for example, “Un-Islamic, evil, etc.). Moreover, through this particular 
feature, we were able to further adjust our query from “Search for Exact 
words” to “Search for synonymous words.” This gave us a wide array of 
word options and tools to better organize and find new emerging themes 
(See sample output to one of the questions asked during the focus group 
testing). 
 
Once we completed our “auto-coding” and ran the “word query,” we 
continued to manually analyze our transcripts, despite the fact that the 
initial words derived from the queries were instrumental in generating 
models demonstrating relationships and patterns that we ought to be 
looking for or expect to find in our respective transcripts.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The focus group testing was an invaluable exercise in understanding how 
certain members of the Somali-American community in San Diego, CA, 
interpret and respond to terrorist violence, specifically as discussed 
through the lens of ICSVE-produced counter-narratives. Despite being an 
all-male sample, a majority of the respondents reported negative 
emotional responses to what they heard from the ISIS defector, especially 
as they discussed about the rape of Syrian women. When participants in 
Focus Group 2 were asked about their views on using Yazidi women, or 
any other women for that matter, as sex slaves, all respondents used 
adjectives such as disturbing, shocking, depressing, etc. to describe them. 
The Chart 1 below depicts Focus Group 2 participant aggregate views and 
feelings when discussing “A Sex Slave for You—A Gift from Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi” video and the use of women as sex slaves, with a majority of 
them using adjectives such as angered (13%), heartbreaking (22%), etc.   
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Chart 1: Opinions About “A Sex Slave for You—A Gift from Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi” and Use of Yazidi Women as Sex Slaves 
 
Source: Author 
 
Also consider the following Focus Group 1 participants’ emotional 
responses to the question of “What do you think about the defector (Abu 
Ghazwan) saying he suffers post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),” when 
viewing “Rewards of Joining the Islamic State’ counternarrative video” 
(The Chart 2 below contains the frequency of adjectives used to describe 
their views and feelings):  
• “I think that anyone would feel the same way.” 
 
• “If you experience things like this, it’s going to have an effect on 
you. It’s part of human nature to deal with nightmares after 
something traumatic.”  
 
13%
22%
18%
13%
13%
4%
4%
13%
Disturbing Angry Depressing Hearbreaking Disgusting Shocking Ashamed Crazy
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Chart 2: Abu Ghazwan (Video) Suffering Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) 
 
Source: Author 
 
The findings run contrary to the assumption that men are less likely to 
show discomfort, fear, or disgust—or are in “total control of their 
emotions”—when interacting with violent content or narratives.78 That 
said, it would be wrong to assume that they are expressing such 
sentiments “as much as women” might, as the sample did not include any 
women. Moreover, as shown above, participants discussed the issue of 
PTSD through accumulation of hardships, arguably rooted in the 
experience of war, which they themselves can relate to through either 
personal or collective memory of the war back in their homeland 
(Somalia). Equally important and strictly speaking in the context of 
participant responses with respect to rape, some Somali Americans may be 
vulnerable to being manipulated emotionally about rape, as past al 
Shabaab recruitment tactics manipulated Somalis to return to their 
homeland (Somali) to fight jihad to prevent the rape of Somali women. In 
this regard, the defense of women’s honor, or a belief system among many 
Arabs and Muslims that valorizes women’s honor, was clearly reflected in 
participant responses. 
 
Focus Group 1 Survey Data 
 
(Frequency of words used to express emotions, feelings, etc. by the 
participants concerning “Rewards of Joining the Islamic State” video. For 
example, unbelievable (12%), tragic (9%), terrible (6%), and wrong (6%) 
were the most frequently selected descriptors). See Chart 3 for a 
breakdown.  
7%
7%
8%
23%
8%
8%
23%
8%
8%
Crazy Depressing Heartbreaking Horrible Intense No pity Saddening Tragic Unsettling
Speckhard et al.: Intervening in and Preventing Somali-American Radicalization with
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2019
51 
 
 
Chart 3: Opinions About “Rewards of Joining the Islamic State” 
Video 
 
Source: Author 
 
Four of the five respondents who chose to identify themselves in the 
survey and during discussion thought the video was credible and that the 
main protagonist (Abu Ghazwan) featured in “Rewards for Joining the 
Islamic State” was telling the truth when discussing his experiences inside 
the ISIS. In viewing “A Sex Slave for You—a Gift from Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi,” four out of five participants believed the speaker was credible 
(See Table 3). Four of the participants noted: 
• “Yes, I think it’s true; no one would make up things like this.”  
 
• “His tone changes when he talked about his mother, so I think it’s 
real based on his emotions I can hear.” 
 
• “You just can’t make things up like this. Even when he talked about 
the religion, he used the right terminology, like “Allah Azzawajal.” 
 
• Four out of five also believed the speaker was telling the truth (See 
table that follows), with some remaining reserved in their views.  
 
Crazy 
3%
Depressing
3%
Difficult to watch
3%
Disturbing
6%
Effective 
3%
Eye-opening
9%
Hearbreaking
6%
Horrible 
3%
Impactful 
3%
Informative
6%
Intense
3%
Real
3%
Sad
6%
Scary
3%
Surreal
3%
Terrible 
6%
Tragic 
9%
Unbelievable 
12%
Unsettling
6%
Wrong 
6%
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•  “Only God knows.” 
 
• “Hard to tell but at the same time it’s realistic.”  
 
• “We couldn’t see his face, so in many ways I have some doubt about 
how real it is.”  
 
• “One thing for sure is that the mothers in the video where not real.”  
 
• “The clips were real and geographic region can attest to that. Only 
someone from the region would know if it’s real or not.” 
 
Some participants, however, questioned the speaker and video’s 
authenticity, asking if they were produced by Hollywood or some 
government-affiliated entity. They also stated that videos would look more 
authentic if the defector faces were actually shown:  
 
• “Yes, look at some of the T.V. shows that are out there regarding 
terrorism they all look real, but it’s made it Hollywood.” 
 
• “I think it would be more real if he showed his face, and maybe kept 
it real and just say he did some raping himself.” 
 
Indeed, we already have evidence suggesting that in the case of counter-
messages that bear the seal of a government entity (for example, U.S. State 
Department), the effectiveness of such counter-messaging may be 
rendered partially, or entirely, ineffective due to such symbolic 
association. However, ICSVE researchers aimed to avoid this by openly 
disclosing in its branding the authorship of the video (for example, using 
the ICSVE seal on the video and clearly attributing authorship to the 
nonprofit). However, it was interesting to see that some participants still 
doubted the production authenticity of the video. The suggestion to show 
the faces of the defectors is an important but difficult, if not impossible, 
request to achieve due to the interviewee’s own security concerns. On a 
positive note, despite some doubts on the authenticity of the speaker due 
to their faces being hidden from the camera, a majority of the participants 
expressed confidence in the authenticity of the ISIS defectors presented in 
the counter-narrative, and even those that had doubts strongly engaged 
with the material presented in it. Thus, despite any doubts, everyone 
engaged with the material that the videos elicited from the group. Even the 
doubters participated in the discussions, suggesting that they may have 
taken the speaker seriously after voicing potential doubts about his 
authenticity and having the chance to have their questions answered by 
the discussion group leader. 
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Focus Group 2 Survey Data 
 
The Table 3 below contains Focus Group 2 participant agreement, as 
measured on a 1-7 scale, on a set of questions pertaining to “Rewards for 
Joining the Islamic State” video.  
 
Table 3. Participant Agreement on “Rewards for Joining the 
Islamic State” Video 
                                                                                                           Scale 1-7 (7-highest/1-lowest agreement) 
                                                                                                        1        2        3            4           5               6               7       
NA 
Video could convince someone joining ISIS                         1                                 1                             3 
not to join ISIS79 
The video affects me how I feel about ISIS                           3                                 1                             1 
The speaker (Abu Ghazwan) was wrong to                                                              1                             4 
place bombs in cars and homes 
The speaker (Abu Ghazwan) was wrong to                                                                                             4               1 
 join ISIS 
The Speaker  (Abu Ghazwan) is real ISIS                                                                       1                       4 
Source: Author 
 
The results of the survey, as shown in the Table 4 and Table 5, indicate an 
unfavorable view of ISIS.80 For example, when looking at the tables, all 
participants in Focus Group 1 believe that ISIS is a terrorist organization 
and that ISIS does not adhere to Quran and Islamic principles. Moreover, 
all of the participants in both focus groups during discussions expressed 
that violence perpetrated by ISIS, namely suicide bombings and violence 
against civilians and other religious and ethnic groups, is never justified. A 
small share of the participants, however, expressed frustration over 
politics and the government of Iraq, including U.S. foreign influence in the 
Middle East. Consider the following statements made by some participants 
when addressing a narrative presented by Abu Ghazwan in the “Rewards 
for joining the Islamic State” counter-narrative as well as how some 
participants echoed the sectarian issues that in part drove Abu Ghazwan to 
join ISIS: 
• “They left the Shia friends go. That’s how their government 
works. If you are a Shia, you’re off the hook. And if you are a 
Sunni or something else, you are going to die in prison.” 
 
• “He was mad at the government, so we need to look at the 
government and the people who are not just; they are the ones 
causing the problem.” 
 
• “To some degree I think it was the leadership and government 
as well [responsible], who are not just to certain groups that 
cause this problem.” 
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• “Well we know our government is responsible for all the 
troubles in almost every country. We can use violence, but we 
need to address the root of the problem.” 
 
• “Hell, no, they never did that, that how you lose your license bro 
you can’t say terrorism and Jewish or Christians in the same 
sentence.” 
 
Focus Group 1 Survey Data 
 
The Table 4 below contains Focus Group One participant opinions, as 
measured on a 1-7 scale, about ISIS.   
 
Table 4. Focus Group 1 Participant Opinions about ISIS 
                                                                                                           Scale 1-7 (7-highest/1-lowest agreement) 
 
                                                                                                      1         2         3            4           5               6            7       
Someone who kills/dies for ISIS is a martyr                      4         1 
ISIS is wrong to kill innocent civilians                                                                                                     5 
ISIS is engaged in violence                                                                                                                          5 
I identify with ISIS’ version of Islam                                    5                                    
ISIS is practicing real Islam                                                    5           
ISIS is following the real Quran                                             5         
ISIS is a terrorist organization                                                                                                                   5 
Source: Author 
 
Focus Group 2 Survey Data 
 
The Table 5 below contains Focus Group Two participant opinions, as 
measured on a 1-7 scale, about ISIS.   
 
Table 5. Focus Group 2 Participant Opinions about ISIS 
                                                                                                           Scale 1-7 (7-highest/1-lowest agreement) 
 
                                                                                                        1        2        3            4           5               6               7       
NA 
ISIS is engaged in violence                                                                     1                                                      4 
ISIS is a terrorist organization                                                              3                                                     4 
ISIS is following the real Quran                                                5 
ISIS is practicing real Islam                                                       5 
I identify with ISIS’ version of  
Islam                                                                                               5 
I disagree with their methods  
(for example, beheadings) but                                                   5 
support their objectives  
ISIS is fighting for Muslim rights                                              4            1 
Source: Author 
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Although opinions on the issue remain mixed, similar to our focus groups 
findings in Zarqa and Irbid in Jordan, sectarian and religious favoritism, 
lack of government responsiveness, and corruption are often blamed for a 
range of ills, including the rise of ISIS, though these conditions are not 
entirely unrealistic.81The issue here is whether participants believe that 
groups like ISIS can help to address the contentious social, economic, 
political, etc. issues or if they should be avoided entirely as offering any 
real and practical solutions to such issues. Exploring and understanding 
such sentiments is crucial given that ISIS’ existence and durability lies in 
its ability to apply its ideology and tactics to the grievances of Sunni 
Muslims around the world. It is how it manages to garner support for its 
cause. As also evidenced in our research in other parts of the world, the 
appeal and attractiveness of ISIS’ non-violent, slickly produced video 
material and propaganda—those that feature some of the themes 
described by our participants, namely the themes of brotherhood, 
victimization, community, religious prosecution, etc.—among those who 
do not profess or sympathize with the group remains especially 
worrisome. 
 
One of the key objectives of the focus group testing was to highlight ISIS’ 
hypocrisy in claiming to be representing the Muslim cause or creating a 
Caliphate run by Muslim ideals in the territory of Iraq and Syria. All 
respondents, in both focus groups, understood the intended message of 
our counternarratives. Likewise, they expressed gratitude for having been 
invited into a safe space where they could openly debate some of the issues 
groups like ISIS raise. Although a small and non-representative sample, 
there are several implications associated with such findings. Firstly, it 
speaks to the quality of the video in terms of both production and the 
manner in which the anti-ISIS message was delivered. Secondly, contrary 
to some assumptions, counternarratives that contain violent footage taken 
from ISIS do not necessarily serve to encourage or glorify the ISIS cause or 
attacks, and may, as we were able to observe, open discussions where 
horror, disgust, and anger over ISIS tactics dominates. Chiefly, such 
findings lend little credibility to claims made by some that any use of 
material produced by ISIS may serve “as a direct or indirect 
encouragement for the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of 
terrorism.”82 No participant raised concern over such an issue. Instead, 
the emotionally evocative material that serves ISIS in their recruiting tasks 
also served us in our ability to open a lively discussion. It is in part through 
such evocative material that participants thought about and discussed 
extremely disturbing socio-political issues—to which ISIS claims to have 
answers—albeit violent answers.   
 
Lastly, ISIS-produced videos and content greatly outnumber counter-
narratives produced by governments and other entities such as ours. Given 
the high-volume production of ISIS material in relation to counter-
messages produced by governments and other entities, individuals in the 
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West often have no idea about, or misunderstand the purpose and use of 
counter narratives. For example, as mentioned above, counter-narratives 
may to a degree serve to mimic ISIS materials but do not in any way glorify 
ISIS. This misunderstanding is sometimes evidenced among counter 
terrorism experts who view our or similar videos, clearly not reflected in 
participant responses. Examples such as these indicate that we need to 
continue to engage in sustained coverage of counter-narratives such as 
ours. 
 
Focus Group 1 Survey Data 
 
As stated earlier in the article, it is highly likely that most, if not all, 
participants in the focus groups already had biased or unfavorable views 
towards ISIS. In fact, when we asked Focus Group 1 “If the 
counternarratives could convince somebody considering joining ISIS not 
to,” two out five doubted the utility of the counter-narrative, primarily 
because they already held unfavorable views towards ISIS. In this regard, 
several of the respondents noted: 
 
• “Not really. I never thought ISIS had any good in them.” 
 
• “They are evil.” 
 
• “I don’t think about them at all.”  
 
The aforementioned may lead some to question the effectiveness of 
counter-narratives. That said, while some of the participants were 
reassuring the fellow group members that they were not vulnerable to 
recruitment, they also strongly engaged with the material. This may also 
suggest that ISIS could also engage them. In other words, although some 
participants claimed that ISIS could never influence them, we were able to 
observe strong emotional responses to the ISIS material. This suggests 
that it is emotionally charged material and important to the participants. 
However, in our case, it was presented in a way that discredited ISIS or 
any violent extremist group as having credible answers. This was the main 
point of the exercise. 
 
There is a caveat in making such assumptions, however. First, most of the 
focus group participants reported having negative attitudes and opinions 
about ISIS. This cannot be dismissed in determining their potential for 
recruitment. However, we must also keep in mind that reporting 
unfavorable opinions about ISIS is the expected response in today’s 
security environment for minority Muslims, first and second-generation 
immigrants. Moreover, most would be hesitant to openly admit in a first 
encounter that they harbor positive sentiments about ISIS out of fear that 
the researchers are informants or that they could somehow be harmed by 
speaking candidly about it.  
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Secondly, just because our focus group participants engaged with our 
counter-narratives, it does not necessarily mean that they would engage 
with material that ISIS would show them. Namely, there are a number of 
predictors that determine how audiences interact with the material. While 
such contentions may hold true, based on our interactions with Somali-
American population, we also know that many do engage with ISIS 
material and endorse parts of their ideology, which makes them vulnerable 
to further ideological indoctrination and recruitment.  
 
One should highlight the utility of openly pointing out lies inherent in 
terrorist propaganda and correcting any doubts and misinformation that 
might be circulating in the participants’ everyday lives. One must also 
stress the utility of creating a safe space in which a vulnerable audience 
can even discuss ISIS’ claims. The voices of defectors, including the voices 
of ISIS victims, are especially powerful if shown in safe environments, 
where a guided discussion can take place. Arguably, building well-
informed and resilient communities is essential to countering violent 
extremist appeal. 
 
One of the goals of the counter narrative videos is to present a learning 
opportunity to youth in which they can learn not through their own 
negative experiences but vicariously as well, namely from others who  
faced similar choices and made serious mistakes in joining ISIS [long] 
before them. When resonating and evoking strong responses, it enables 
the viewers to imagine themselves accepting the ISIS claims and ending up 
in the bad circumstances that are being narrated to them in the video. 
While they may strongly identify with the extremist rhetoric, mainly 
rooted in victimization narrative, it gives them a chance, without having to 
commit a mistake themselves, to learn that trying to solve the victimhood 
dilemma through solutions offered by ISIS is unlikely to end well. 
Counternarratives such as ours also explore feelings, and not just words. 
This is the reason why they are highly likely to influence vulnerable 
individuals to learn from other people’s negative experiences and 
mistakes. Should they be confronted with and lured into ISIS “remedies” 
at some point in their lives, the counter-narratives also serve to offer 
additional tools to the participants to potentially address and advise other 
vulnerable individuals. 
 
The ISIS cadres interviewed in the Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter 
Narrative Project, including the ones shown to the focus group 
participants, often share and discuss their own psychological needs and 
sufferings. They attempt to make sense of their experiences leading to and 
inside of ISIS and what it means now to not only themselves (for example, 
spending prison time, having traumatic experiences, etc.) but to others as 
well (for example, pain, suffering, etc. they may have caused to others). By 
viewing such material, the focus group participants engaged in an 
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interactive learning process, whereby the process itself facilitated a 
narrative exchange. It is through such processes that focus group 
participants not only discussed personal experiences but may also have 
possibly facilitated impactful disengagement and radicalization processes 
involving others. One respondent shared a personal experience related to 
the rape of a relative sparked after watching “A Sex Slave for You—A Gift 
from Abu Bakr al Baghdadi” video. The personal story of the participant 
added a degree of relatedness to the defector story, including authenticity 
to the story told by him. The respondent comments and reactions by other 
discussants are captured below:   
 
• “Yeah bro why not, how the [expletive] are they being held captive 
[Yazidi sex slaves] and caught in the first place. It’s [expletive] other 
man who let that happen. So, since they are being raped now, that 
means next time protecting your [expletive] women. I would die 
before telling that [expletive] happen.”  
 
• “Yo calm down with that [expletive] man! I have a family member 
who was raped and beaten to death and it has nothing to do with 
not being able to protect them.” 
 
• “I’m sorry to hear that bro. I don’t mean it’s right for it to happen. 
But I’m sorry to hear that. Very emotional (10-minute break) 
participant in tears! Do you want to talk about how you feel?”  
 
• “No, I’m okay. Just want to say that you can lose someone you love 
and close to you by rape and force. It has nothing to do with ISIS or 
politics, or Sunni and Shia. If I was there I would do anything to 
change the outcome I would give my life bro! But Allah didn’t place 
us there to stop it or have the ability to even know about it. He 
knows what’s best.”  
 
Arguably, throughout both focus groups, the videos—even if some at first 
doubted their authenticity—were able to reach vulnerable youth and open 
them up to in-depth discussions of the topics that ISIS tries to use to 
ensnare them on the Internet. All the participants shared their unfavorable 
view of ISIS. Some were either already against ISIS before engaging with 
the materials or clearly became so when confronted with the troubling 
experiences of the ISIS cadres denouncing the claims ISIS had made to 
them and the clear reality that joining had not in any way enhanced their 
lives. 
 
Limitations 
 
Several important limitations apply to the focus group findings. It seems 
likely that most, if not all, participants who took part in the focus group 
testing already had unfavorable views towards ISIS in general. However, it 
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is also likely that subjects may have particular beliefs and views that align 
with ISIS’ claims. This can make them open to manipulation and more 
favorable towards ISIS. Our goal was the opposite in this regard: To 
challenge anything where they might believe ISIS was in the right. 
Likewise, given the security environment in which Somali American youth 
feel suspicious of CVE efforts, the sample participants might have been 
hesitant to truthfully share their sentiments about ISIS and its ideology. In 
fact, some admitted to the focus group moderator that there are no forums 
where they can speak openly and safely about these issues without 
suspecting that, others might be informants or that their views will be 
misconstrued in some way, shape. This leaves them vulnerable to not fully 
developing their resistance and resilience to terrorist group recruitment. 
 
It is likely that in any such sample there may be some who fall on a 
spectrum: Those who are truly radicalized and already supportive of ISIS 
and its ideology, but unlikely to openly admit it; those who are at risk of 
radicalization; those who hold unfavorable views about ISIS; and those 
who are simply neutral about ISIS. Moreover, the focus group served to 
test the utility of counternarratives in supporting negative attitudes 
towards ISIS or increasing negative existing attitudes towards ISIS as well 
as challenging any views that might support ISIS, but it did not measure 
the possibility of interesting focus group participants further in ISIS and 
its ideology.83 It also did not utilize control and comparison groups, which 
could be done in the future. This would entail experimental designs (for 
example, the treatment, and the control groups with random assignment) 
or quasi-experimental designs (post-test only, time-series design etc.).84 
 
Lastly, while many participants might have already had unfavorable views 
towards ISIS and might not favor or succumb to extremist narratives, the 
focus group testing served as an opportunity for the participants to access 
and learn about educational resources that openly target violent extremist 
groups like ISIS. Similarly, as researchers, we gained additional knowledge 
on the most appealing and resonating aspects of the video. The group 
discussions also presented an opportunity for the participants to talk 
about difficult topics and debate claims made by ISIS. Participants would 
have generally avoided discussing them if they judged the environment not 
to be safe. The participants were also offered information that they can use 
the videos to target and educate others who might be vulnerable to such 
extremist narratives, namely serve as influencers to magnify the impact of 
the counternarratives. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article highlighted the results of the ICSVE counter-narrative focus 
group testing administered with a small sample of Somali youth in San 
Diego, California. It also presented methodological argument, or a case 
study, in the use of counter narratives as an effective Counter Violent 
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Extremism (CVE) tool.85 The small sample sizes do not allow us to 
generalize the findings. However, the research is important in measuring 
attitudes towards violent extremist groups like ISIS, which remains largely 
under-researched in the context of Somali-American community in the 
United States. The goal was to offer and test for the Somali-American 
community in San Diego tools to fight the appeal of violent extremist 
groups in their respective communities. Our research shows that when 
administered in a focus group setting with a trusted Somali focus group 
moderator, such tools can be highly effective in generating invaluable 
discussions around issue related to ISIS recruitment and ISIS-related 
radicalization. 
 
This research is considered a “community-based participatory research,” 
namely the one in which Somali-Americans served as core members of our 
research team and ensured that our research design and objectives were 
closely aligned with those of the participant community. We also 
attempted to ensure that the participants had a strong stake in 
understanding and preventing violent extremism in their respective 
communities. In addition, by engaging in community-based participatory 
research, we strove to ensure that the participants do not feel as though 
they are being unfairly targeted or stigmatized in relation to our research 
objectives.86 In that regard, we also judged the effort a success as 
participants expressed gratitude for being invited to participate as well as 
given the opportunity of a safe environment in which to discuss difficult 
topics related to ISIS and violent extremism in general. It is our view that 
without the emotionally evocative nature of the videos such discussions 
may have fallen flat, but given the videos, lively discussions took place.  
 
The findings do not suggest that we certainly reached a pool of “at-risk” 
individuals for radicalization, including radicalization leading to violence, 
as we have in our previous studies.87 Such findings, however, should not 
prevent us from concluding that though at times with narrow limits and 
applications, counter-narratives remain one among many important tools 
in countering the appeal of violent extremism. While we realize this is just 
one tool among many, we, in fact, acknowledge that assuming primacy of 
any CVE tool would be detrimental to the CVE objectives we are trying to 
address, both in terms of response and prevention efforts. However, given 
the scale of participant engagement in focus group discussions, we were 
able to indeed touch on the same issues that ISIS attempts to manipulate 
in its recruitment efforts. Arguably, if not already turned off, the 
participants in our discussions were even further turned away from ISIS 
and bolstered by the counter-narratives and ensuing discussions in those 
negative views of ISIS. Thus, we feel confident that these tools can be used 
if carried out in a safe and careful way to effectively fight and disrupt ISIS 
recruitment. They can be used for both interventions and prevention of 
ISIS-related radicalization in the Somali American community. 
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Our focus group testing with the Somali-American community members 
was carried out in conjunction with several other research studies 
conducted by our center worldwide. In all instances, in our experience, the 
emotional and conversational nature of targeted prevention is best carried 
through face-to-face interactions and through interpersonal activity, in 
which counter-narratives play a crucial role in facilitating such 
engagement and interpersonal activity.88 However, given the widespread 
use of Internet learning, we also acknowledge that such materials can also 
be instrumental online, although lacking the personal care and touch that 
a discussion moderator can offer. Given that ISIS was able to leverage 
social media feedback mechanisms to contact those who respond to their 
online material, the same should be possible for those wishing to use the 
counter-narrative videos in a similar manner—contacting those who 
respond to them for further online discussions, possibly leading to offline 
meetings. Future research will focus on more targeted efforts, and ideally 
with other vulnerable and “at-risk” individuals for radicalization, including 
radicalization leading to violence. Our efforts with respect to the members 
of American-Somali community focused on small wins over the long haul 
against ISIS and other similar extremist groups.  
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Appendix A 
 
Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter-Narrative Project 
 
The International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) 
researchers, alongside its European branch staff members in Brussels, 
Belgium, has been interviewing ISIS defectors, returnees, and prisoners 
over the last three years—most interviews captured on video with a sample 
of 94 interviews having been collected worldwide to date. ICSVE 
researchers have also interviewed 16 al-Shabaab members and their family 
members. The resulting video interviews are edited down to their most 
damning content to discredit ISIS (and organizations like ISIS) and 
delegitimize them as corrupt, un-Islamic, and brutal. The video clips 
feature ISIS insiders denouncing the group as well as make use of actual 
ISIS propaganda film (reframed with disgust and turned back against 
itself) to illustrate the speaker’s words. These counter narrative videos 
depict mostly young men and women who were drawn into ISIS out of 
hopes for a better life, a desire to live an Islamic way of life, and to build 
the Islamic Caliphate. They were drawn out of vulnerabilities that often 
match those in the Somali American community. The ICSVE-produced 
narratives feature how the speaker was drawn into the group, what he/she 
at first believed and liked, and how he/she was deeply disappointed over 
time. The speakers discuss and share the experiences that turned them 
away from ISIS and the price they paid, in many cases, for joining. They 
also advise others not to join. 
The video clips are subtitled in the over 21 languages in which ISIS recruits 
(Albanian, Arabic, Bosnian, Serbo-Croatian, Finnish, French, German, 
Italian, Russian, Somali, Spanish, Swedish, Turkish, and UzbekMany of 
these languages are relevant to migrant and immigrant descent Muslim 
youth, as well as ordinary citizens that ISIS and organizations like ISIS are 
reaching inside the United States and elsewhere. Our experience with 
Somali American youth, however, is that they would generally interact 
with our English subtitled videos. 
The videos are currently being used on five continents by law enforcement, 
intelligence officers, counselors, teachers, prison workers and other P/CVE 
professionals. The following represents applications of our counter-
narrative videos. It also spells out several key indicators that serve as both 
direct and indirect measure of our success in terms of detection, early 
intervention, and prevention using these counter narratives:  
• A thirteen-year-old boy from London, UK, hell-bent on going to 
Raqqa, Syria, turned back by viewing one of the ICSVE-produced 
videos. The account was documented and reported by a UK Prevent 
counselor who worked closely with the boy.  
• An ISIS emir (ISIS superior) interviewed in Iraq by ICSVE 
researchers hanging his head in shame after viewing two of the 
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ICSVE-produced counternarratives, and admitting, “We were 
wrong. We argued over some of these in the group [as presented in 
our counternarratives]. We gave a bad face to Islam.”  
• Multiple focus groups of the ICSVE counter-narratives in the 
United States, Central Asia, the Middle East (With vulnerable youth 
in hotbeds of radicalization, such as Zarqa, Irbid, and Salt in 
Jordan), and the Balkans, leading to open and lively discussions, as 
well as better understandings on how youth view ISIS and what 
their vulnerabilities are in potentially being recruited into the 
group. The focus groups also served to understand what resonates 
most with ISIS supporters and sympathizers in terms of our content 
and how the emotionally evocative nature of the videos helped open 
up countering violent extremism discussions that might otherwise 
be hard to hold, as the participants might be reticent to share their 
experiences and concerns. This helped to solidify our belief in the 
effectiveness of our counter-narrative videos. 
• Prison and CVE officials in Central Asia agreeing that most effective 
narratives against violent extremist group recruitment come from 
convicted terrorists who engage with fellow prisoners in ideological 
and religious debates and from ISIS defectors and returnees from 
the conflict zones in Iraq and Syria who can communicate about the 
dangers of joining violent extremist groups. Our videos are 
currently being used by law enforcement officials in Kyrgyzstan 
(hosted on their official website) to fight and raise awareness about 
the appeal of violent extremism in the country. Through use of 
counter-narratives such as ours, they also hope to use them in 
prison prevention and deradicalization efforts, including in the case 
of those who have served prison time and are now on probation.  
• Training law enforcement, intelligence officers, and other CVE 
professionals around the world on their use and applications. 
Working closely with teachers as well. The U.S. Embassy in 
Copenhagen is making them available in Danish subtitles. The 
counter narratives are also accompanied with study guides in 
Danish for teachers to use as a prevention and intervention tools in 
their respective classrooms. 
• Sending out our counter-narratives on Facebook and Telegram in 
attempts to reach and influence ISIS supporters and sympathizers 
online. ICSVE researchers successfully identified 50 English and 77 
Albanian speaking Facebook profiles that were coded as highly 
radicalized based on their endorsements of ISIS materials and 
association with ISIS-related networks online. These accounts were 
successfully tagged with ICSVE videos in attempts to generate 
increased cognitive dissonance and discussions against ISIS. 
• Conducting over 60 awareness campaigns over Facebook, resulting 
in over 1.7 million views in Iraq alone. Considerable discussion was 
generated in these campaigns as well. Such discussions serve as a 
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testament to the ability of the ICSVE counter narrative videos to 
evoke thought-provoking engagement.  
• Increasing interaction over YouTube with the ICSVE counter 
narrative videos, including many claims that ISIS is still strong and 
powerful. This indicates that our videos are reaching the correct 
audiences. The ICSVE team has recently built a  new website 
(www.theRealJihad.org) to not only measure  the efficacy of its  
interventions online (for example, tracing conversions, leads, etc.) 
but also redirect those landing on its website to more tolerant 
interpretations of Islam and referrals for psychological and other 
support to walk away from terrorism. We hope that the website will 
also lead the viewer into a deeper engagement with our counter 
narrative materials. The English version of the website already has 
over 90,000 viewers. 
• The ICSVE team is also continuing to follow up on the training 
provided to law enforcement, intelligence, and other CVE 
practitioners worldwide to generate an assessment on the extent to 
which such trainings have better equipped these professionals in 
their fight against violent extremism.  
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